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Strategic Stability:  
An Ever-Broadening Concept 
•  The traditional definition: ability to retaliate 
•  Russian participant: “Strategic stability means 
the sustainability of the strategic nuclear 
equilibrium which may be preserved for a 
prolonged period of time despite the 
influence of destabilizing factors.” 
•  How can anything be “prolonged” nowadays, 
when technology and political landscape 





Scope of Workshop 
•  Impact on strategic stability of: 
–  Rapid development of strategic technologies 
–  American desire to reduce the role of nuclear 
weapons 
–  Regional instability in Europe, Middle East, 
East Asia, and South Asia 
•  How will technological change and 






Ukraine: the “Strategic Shock” 
•  American speaker: “Ukraine has 
fundamentally altered the U.S. view of 
Russia throughout the government.  For 
many Americans, it is the most important 
event in Russo-American relations since 
the end of the Cold War.” 
•  Not a workshop about Ukraine, but it cast 






Russian View of Strategic Stability 
•  What we do, strengthens strategic stability; 
whatever Americans do, endangers it. 
–  Russian participant: “Present Russian political 
and academic elites are much more inclined to 
approach strategic stability in a ‘broad sense’ – 
simply declaring various types of armaments or 
activity (in military and/or political sphere) of the 
other side as undermining strategic stability.” 
•  Nuclear weapons are central for Russian 
military posture and national security 
•  Traditional challenges still salient: 





New Challenges: the Russian view 
•  Long range conventional PGMs – the new BIG fear 
•  Non-deployed warheads 
•  American technological superiority 
•  NATO/US conventional superiority 
•  Nuclear terrorism (mostly mentioned by experts) 
•  Deterrence may not apply to such countries as India 
and Pakistan (mostly mentioned by experts) 
•  Color revolution 
•  Fears rooted in US/NATO activities in former Soviet 
republics as well as belief that US will use military 





New Challenges: the American view 
•  Russian idea (contained in 2010 military doctrine) of 
using nuclear weapons for conflict de-escalation 
•  Russian military doctrine points to NATO as military 
threat 
–  “The next iteration of Russian military doctrine will be 
even worse”: it will name the US and NATO as enemies 
–  One Russian participant suggested the 2010 doctrine is 
irrelevant and ignored by the military 
•  Likely violation (circumvention) of INF Treaty 
•  Russia developing new counterforce capability 
•  Ukraine, and future Ukraines 
–  Putin’s intent to “snap back hard” against containment 





•  Rise of China 
•  Proliferation of 
– WMD 
– Ballistic missiles 
– Cyber and space 
capabilities 
Russia 
•  Russia is “not in 










Regional Concerns: Europe 
•  The region of sharpest US – Russian confrontation 
•  Operation in Crimea: only small numbers of special forces 
•  Danger: Success in Ukraine would encourage further 
adventures not supported by substantial conventional 
forces 
•  Could we see escalation from special forces action 
straight to nuclear use? 
•  How to defend Baltics when the Russian doctrine calls for 
conventional cruise missile strikes and use of nuclear 
forces if the West prevails in defense?  
–  Russian participant: Military planners pay no attention to 
doctrine 
•  How to promote proactive and preventive deterrence of a 
regime that cannot be trusted? 





Regional Concerns: Middle East 
•  Despite cooperation on Iran and on 
chemical weapons in Syria, WMD is not a 
major concern for the Kremlin 
•  Russia is drawing its own red line in Syria 
•  Preventing return of Islamist militants from 
Syria to Russia 
•  Focus is on arms exports to the region to 
bolster domestic industry 
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Regional Concerns: East Asia 
•  Both sides are concerned about China’s power, but the 
Russians are keeping quiet officially 
•  US goal: reduce dependence on nuclear deterrence and 
rely more on conventional deterrence, while still assuring 
allies of extended deterrent commitments 
•  Russian theme: distrust and cooperation 
•  Expect that Chinese nuclear forces will grow, move away 
from minimal deterrence 
•  Nuclear weapons in the absence of substantial 
conventional forces 
–  If Russia cooperates with China in the field of strategic weapons, 
this is kept very secret 
•  Russia has taken a back seat when it comes to N. Korea 
–  Recommendation: maintain secret contacts with Moscow 





Regional Concerns: South Asia 
•  Russia views South Asia via Afghanistan 
and Central Asia 
•  Russia sees potential for cooperation with 
India on Afghanistan 
•  But overall, Russia is not in the business 





Conclusions - 1 
•  US & Russia must find a new model for their relationship 
–  No chance for dialogue on NSNW 
–  No chance for dialogue on BMD 
–  What should we talk about?  
•  Russia is not stable politically and economically, and Russia’s 
collapse is an unacceptable risk 
•  The Prague vision is not practical – no one but the US is 
interested in Global Zero. Russia is against it.  
•  Russian participant: “Strategic stability is fragile – we cannot 
count on strategic arsenals preserving stability when NSNW 
are proliferating.” 
•  Russian participant: “[US and Russia] have to continue 
dialogue on strategic weapons – if we stop it, it would be a 
bad message to other countries” 
•  Russian participant: “Acknowledgement (presumably – 
informal) of the zones of vital interests of Russia and USA 





Conclusions - 2 
•  American participant: “We need to continue thinking and 
discussing how new capabilities in space, cyber warfare, 
precision strike and missile defense are related to our 
concepts of strategic stability, which developed from 
Cold War nuclear-only thinking.” 
•  American Participant: “We need a series of workshops, 
seminars and table-top exercises on how our competing 
visions of doctrine and capabilities might play out in a 
confrontation or crisis where the use of force is a real 
possibility.  Such a confrontation is unlikely but not 
impossible.”  
•  Obstacles to assessing strategic stability: mix of 
defensive and offensive weapons, conventional and 
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